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Abstract We consider a Ramsey model with several households with heterogeneous
preferences who are able to borrow capital to each other. Since the capital constraints
of one household then depends on the others’ capital, one can no longer optimize
each household’s welfare individually. This problem formulation leads to a Pareto
optimization problem. We consider existence and first order optimality conditions as
well as some numerical results.
Keywords Ramsey model · Pareto optima · optimality conditions
1 Introduction
Our paper deals with a variation of the neoclassical growth model developed by Ram-
sey (1928) in the twenties of the last century. The interesting part in the Ramsey
model is the endogenous saving rate that is determined by the welfare optimization
of households under a given market interest rate. Ramsey himself did not restrict the
capital stock held by one of the individuals in the respective economy, but this capital
stock is often constrained in the literature. Actually, Ramsey’s model has been mod-
ified and analyzed in various ways. A vast literature exists that deals with different
types of equilibria, with finite or infinite time horizons in a continuous or a discrete
setting, considers taxation (Sorger, 2002) or a growing population (Acemoglu, 2009),
models a central planning authority (Cass, 1965) or studies Pareto optimization for a
set of different households that are connected by their initial capital distribution (Van
and Vailakis, 2003).
In this paper we consider a group of H economic agents (or households) with
heterogeneous preferences. Each agent is endowed with an initial capital asset (ah0),
L. Frerick · E.W. Sachs · L. Somorowsky
Department of Mathematics, Trier University, 54286 Trier, Germany
G. Mu¨ller-Fu¨rstenberger
Department of Economics, Trier University, 54286 Trier, Germany
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
01
29
4v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
9
2 L. Frerick et al.
and receives an income stream from supplying its labor-force (lht ). Income from labor
and capital is split between consumption and savings, where “savings” can be neg-
ative. Agents seek to maximize intertemporal welfare, the time horizon is assumed
finite (T ∈N). The number of agents is assumed small relative to the total population,
hence an agent’s activity has no impact on commodity and asset prices.
Although this set-up is close to the standard Ramsey problem, where agents
smooth their consumption path by shifting income over time via the capital mar-
ket, it differs significantly. We now assume that the agents have formed a coalition to
establish a capital sub-market. There they can borrow or lend to each other at world
market interest rates, but the coalition’s net debt-position must be non-negative in
every point in time. Therefore some agents may have negative capital assets, but the
coalition is free of debt when considered from the outside. In other words, the coali-
tion makes sure that the default of individual debtors has no repercussions on the
world markets. Since each agent’s capital depends on the capital of the other agents
and they altogether must have a nonnegative capital stock, we have to optimize their
welfare simultaneously, which leads to a vector or Pareto optimization problem.
The real world situation we have in mind is a small country. Because of finan-
cial disruption, foreign investors lost confidence in its solvency. The country is still
embedded in the global capital market system, but its net-debt position must now be
positive at any point in time. In this way, the outstanding loans may serve as collat-
eral for outstanding debt, hence the country cannot default as a whole on its foreign
debtors.1
Another example is a credit union, where its members team up to lend and borrow
to each other at world market conditions but do not need to fulfill all regulations of
global capital markets. Also peer-to-peer banking serves as another example for our
model. Via online platforms private individuals borrow money to other ones. Our idea
is, that individual agents are allowed to incur debt (what weakens the market imper-
fection) but the community as a whole has to hold a non-negative capital stock. Like
Becker et al. (2015), we avoid the market imperfection that forbid the households to
incur debt and define a new capital restriction instead.
In order to ensure the existence of a solution of the households optimization prob-
lem (and its uniqueness), the capital stock of the households is often constrained. That
is why borrowing constraints are introduced which are huge market imperfections in
the context of economics. The most common way to constrain the household’s capital
stock is to bound it from below by zero (see Alt, 2002; Becker, 1987, 1980; Becker
et al., 1991; Sorger, 2002).
An approach to weaken the assumption of a non-negative capital stock of each
household in an infinite time horizon model is the liberal borrowing constraint of
Becker et al. (2015). In this model households are allowed even to hold negative
capital stocks only if they can cover their loans by future wage incomes for a given
finite time horizon.
There have been various approaches to Pareto optimization in the literature. Van
and Vailakis (2003) and Lucas and Stokey (1984) both showed the existence of a
Pareto optimal consumption path using scalarization and Debreu’s theory of a val-
1 We do not discuss in this paper, how this is framed into institutions.
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uation equilibrium (see Debreu, 1954). In our context, we analyze the households
optimization problem in the context of vector optimization theory. We will use the
definition of a minimal element of a set according to Jahn (1996) which is equivalent
to the commonly known definition of a Pareto optimum in the finite dimensional real
space. The vector optimization approach allows us to optimize independently from
a priori defined scalarization weights, which is a generalization of the household’s
optimization problem in the Ramsey model. If one is interested in a particular Pareto
solution from the (possibly large) set of Pareto solutions, there is need of a “(human)
decision maker who knows the problem domain” or a technique to choose the “best”
Pareto solution in an appropriate way (Klamroth and Miettinen, 2008).
The main issue in this paper is a mathematical rigorous theory about the existence
and characterization of Pareto optimal allocations for the households’ sector in such
a setting. We assume that agents can have negative capital assets (aht ∈ R) for all
periods, however the aggregated capital stock has to be nonnegative at all times. This
is called the generalized Ramsey model with partially accepted default. Moreover, we
consider the case where no agent is allowed to exit the economy at T +1 with negative
savings. We call this the generalized Ramsey model without default. In the paper we
use mathematical optimization theory to show the existence of optimal points in a
vector optimization context. Then we formulate necessary and sufficient optimality
conditions and interpret them in the two special contexts we alluded to earlier. To our
knowledge this is new to the literature.
We model the household’s sector analogously to Becker (1987), i.e. we consider
an economy with many households that differ in preferences according to time and
utility. Becker (1987) has shown that -under certain assumptions- in the long-run the
most patient household holds all the money - a conjecture of Ramsey that was proven
here for the first time. However, there are variants of the Ramsey model where the
steady state is non-degenerate (see Sarte, 1997; Lucas and Stokey, 1984). In order
to keep the model as general as possible, we allow different discount factors and
instantaneous utilities. The analysis of a possible impact on the steady state in our
generalized model with an infinite time horizon is part of our future work.
In the second section we define the underlying optimization problem and state
various assumptions. An existence theorem is proven in section 3. The necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions are derived in section 4 and they are discussed in
various lemmas and corollaries. Section 5 deals with a slightly modified problem and
section 6 concludes with some numerical results.
2 Problem Setting as a Vector Optimization Problem
In this paper, we formulate a version of the well-known Ramsey Equilibrium Model
that allows for households with different preferences according to time and utility. We
consider the Ramsey model with a discrete set of households, a single capital good
and a competitive labor market. Time is measured in discrete periods t ∈ {0, ...,T},
T ∈ N. We assume the households to be heterogeneous with respect to utility and
time preferences.
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We denote the instantaneous utility function of each household by
uh : (0,∞)→ R, h ∈ {1, ...,H}, H ∈ N,
and the respective time discount factor by β h ∈ (0,1). Households are assumed to
discount future utility exponentially (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 180). Every household is
endowed with lh ∈R+ units of labor per period which it supplies in an inelastic way.
We denote the wage rate in period t by ωt ≥ 1 and the interest rate by rt > 0 which
we assume both to be given.
These assumptions have some consequences: First of all, there do exist differ-
ences in income between the households due to differences in labor capacity. Second,
the evaluation of lifetime utility depends on the the households consumption profile
and the amount of labor it is able to supply. And thirdly, the only variable in the pro-
duction sector is the aggregated capital the households supply since labor is treated
as a fixed factor.
We assume the initial capital endowment of every household to be given by ah0 ∈R
such that the aggregated initial capital endowment satisfies
H
∑
h=1
ah0 > 0.
Furthermore, we assume that the capital stock aht of every household h ∈ {1, ...,H}
in period t ∈ {0, ...,T} declines by a factor δ ∈ (0,1) and the investment increases
by a factor τ ≥ 1 during every period. The consumption of household h in period t is
denoted by cht > 0. Hence, the capital stock held by household h at the beginning of
period t +1 is given by the following equation
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht .
In contrast to many well-established models like in Becker (1980), we do allow nega-
tive capital stocks in all periods. This means that single households can incur debt, but
we assume that the aggregated capital stock of all households remains non-negative
over all time periods, i.e.
H
∑
h=1
aht ≥ 0, t = 1, ...,T +1. (1)
Moreover, we postulate that the households are competitive agents that perfectly
foresee the sequence of factor returns, {rt ,ωt}Tt=0. Then, every household has to solve
the following utility maximization problem:
max
(ch,ah)
T
∑
t=0
(β h)tuh(cht ), h = 1, ...,H,
s.t. aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht , h = 1, ...,H, t = 0, ...,T,
H
∑
h=1
aht ≥ 0, t = 1, ...,T +1, cht > 0, t = 0, ...,T,
with
H
∑
h=1
ah0 > 0, (a
h
0)
H
h=1 given.
(2)
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The constants satisfy the following conditions:
rt , lh > 0, ωt ,τ ≥ 1, β h,δ ∈ (0,1). (3)
If we replace the condition (1), that only the aggregate capital stock is non-negative,
by the usual condition in the literature (see for example Becker, 1980) that this non-
negativity holds for the capital stock of each household, i.e.
aht ≥ 0, h = 1, ..., .H, t = 1, ...,T +1
at any time instance, then the H optimization problems in (2) are decoupled and can
be solved separately from each other.
The fact that a household can accumulate debt, if they altogether have non-negative
accumulated capital stock, makes this optimization problem more interesting but also
mathematically more challenging. The optimization problem (2) is a multi-objective
optimization problem and we use the notation of Pareto-optimality to define solutions
of this optimization problem.
For notational purposes, we rewrite the H optimization problems in (2) as a vector
optimization problem in order to find a Pareto optimal solution for all households. Let
us define the vector valued objective functional
ϕ : R2H(T+1)→ RH ,
ϕh(z) :=−
T
∑
t=0
(β h)tuh(cht ), h = 1, ...,H
(4)
with variables
z = (c10,c
1
1, ...,c
1
T , ...,c
H
0 , ...,c
H
T ,a
1
1, ...,a
1
T+1, ...,a
H
1 , ...,a
H
T+1)
T ∈ R2H(T+1)
and a set of functions
uh : (0,∞)→ R, h = 1, ...,H
which satisfy the so-called Inada Condition:
Assumption 1 [Inada Condition] For h = 1, ...,H let uh : (0,∞)→ R be twice con-
tinuously differentiable and the following conditions hold:
(uh)′(c)> 0, (uh)′′(c)< 0, c > 0,
limc→∞(uh)′(c) = 0, limc→0(uh)′(c) = +∞, h = 1, ...,H.
(5)
This condition guarantees that households choose a positive consumption at each
point of time (see for example Becker et al., 1991) which will be essential in context
of the first order conditions later on. On the other hand, this also implies that the
feasible set is not necessarily compact which has to be considered in an existence
proof.
In order to formulate the constraints, we define the following mappings
f : R2H(T+1)→ RH(T+1), g : R2H(T+1)→ RT+1
6 L. Frerick et al.
by
f ht (z) := a
h
t+1− τωt lh− (τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht + τcht , t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H
and
gt(z) :=−
H
∑
h=1
aht , t = 1, ..,T +1.
The components of the function f are set as follows
f = ( f1, ..., fH(T+1))
T = ( f 10 , ..., f
1
T , ..., f
H
0 , ..., f
H
T )
T .
Then, the aggregated optimization problem of all households can be written as a
vector optimization problem in the following way.
Definition 1 Let the vector (a10, ...,a
H
0 ) be given such that ∑
H
h=1 a
h
0 > 0. Then we
define the vector optimization problem
min
z∈U
ϕ(z) (6)
where U denotes the set of feasible points
U := {z ∈ Uˆ : f ht (z) = 0 (t = 0, ...,T ; h = 1, ...,H),
gt(z)≤ 0 (t = 1, ...,T +1)}
with
Uˆ := {z ∈ R2H(T+1) : z1, ...,zH(T+1) > 0}.
It is easy to prove that the feasible set is nonempty which is stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The feasible set U is nonempty.
This can be seen easily from equation (2) by choosing
cht = ωt l
h > 0, aht+1 = (τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht .
In the sequel of the paper we consider Pareto optimal points which are defined as
follows:
Definition 2 We consider a solution z ∈U to be Pareto optimal if and only if there
does not exist any vector z ∈U such that
ϕh(z)≤ ϕh(z) and ϕh∗(z)< ϕh∗(z) for at least one h∗ ∈ {1, ...,H}.
In the following sections we will consider questions like the existence of Pareto opti-
mal points and optimality conditions. The latter ones will be interpreted in context of
the application for the Ramsey model.
Pareto-Optima for a Generalized Ramsey Model 7
3 Existence Theorem
The proof of existence of Pareto optima turns out to be somewhat delicate, since in
general the set of of feasible pointsU is not a closed set. This cannot be fixed easily,
since the objective functions uh(c) are defined only for positive c and is not defined
for c = 0 like the log-function, a typical utility function.
This particular difficulty is often ignored in the literature and it is our goal to
provide a rigorous proof for this problem. In order to prove the existence of a Pareto
optimal solution of (6) we use an existence theorem in Jahn (1996) and the technique
of level sets.
The definition of a Pareto optimum given above is akward to use from a mathe-
matical point of view, we introduce the definition of a minimal element according to
Jahn (1996).
Definition 3 Define the natural ordering cone of RH as
CRH := {y ∈ RH : yi ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,H}.
An element y∗ of ϕ(U ) is called a minimal element of ϕ over U if it satisfies
({y∗}−CRH )∩ϕ(U ) = {y∗}.
This definition is in analogy to the definition 2, however formulated in mathematical
terms.
Theorem 1 There exists a Pareto optimal solution of (6).
Proof According to Jahn (1996, p. 139) we define a section Sy of the image S :=
ϕ(U ) as
Sy := ({y}−CRH )∩ϕ(U ) 6= /0
for an arbitrary y ∈ RH . Theorem 6.3 in Jahn (1996, p. 140) guarantees the existence
of a minimal element of ϕ(U ), if the set ϕ(U ) has a compact section for some
y ∈ RH .
By Lemma 1 the set of feasible points U is not empty. Hence there exists an
element z ∈U and y := ϕ(z) ∈ ϕ(U ) and we can define the section
Sy := ϕ(U )∩ ({y}−CRH ). (7)
We rewrite for given initial values ah0 the feasible set as
U := {(c10,c11, ...,c1T , ...,cH0 , ...,cHT ,a11, ...,a1T+1, ...,aH1 , ...,aHT+1)T ∈ R2H(T+1) :
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H,
H
∑
h=1
aht ≥ 0, t = 1, ...,T +1, cht > 0, t = 0, ...,T}
From
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht = ξ ht + γtaht − τcht
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with ξ ht := τωt lh and γt := (τ(1+ rt)−δ ) we obtain by induction
aht+1 =
t
∑
s=0
ξ hs
t
∏
v=s+1
γv +
t
∏
s=0
γsah0− τ(
t
∑
s=0
chs
t
∏
v=s+1
γv) (8)
with∏ /0 γv := 1. The constants in assumption 3 yield γt ≥ 0, ξ ht ≥ 0 and cht > 0 for all
h ∈ {1, ...,H} and t ∈ {1, ...,T} and hence for some constant amax
aht+1 ≤
t
∑
s=0
ξ hs
t
∏
v=s+1
γv +
t
∏
s=0
γsah0 ≤ amax, t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H. (9)
The bound from below for aht follows from (1) via
−(H−1)amax ≤−
H
∑
k=1
k 6=h
akt ≤ aht h = 1, ...,H, t = 1, ...,T +1.
The boundedness of the cht can be concluded from (1), (8) and (9):
0≤
H
∑
h=1
aht+1 =
H
∑
h=1
(
amax− τ(
t
∑
s=0
chs
t
∏
v=s+1
γv)
)
This holds if and only if
H
∑
h=1
t
∑
s=0
chs
t
∏
v=s+1
γv ≤ Hτ amax.
Since cht are positive for all t and h we obtain that all c
h
t are also bounded from
above.
We have shown that U is bounded and therefore also φ(U ) and consequently is
the section Sy¯ also a bounded set. Unfortunately, the closedness cannot be concluded
in this way, because, due to cht > 0, the set U is not closed in general. However, we
can prove directly that the section Sy is closed using a level set argument because
Sy := ϕ(U )∩ ({y}−CRH ) = {ϕ(z) : z ∈U ,ϕh(z)≤ yh h = 1, ...,H}.
Since we have previously shown that the cht are bounded from above, i.e. for some
cmax > 0 we have
cht ≤ cmax, h = 1, ...,H, t = 1, ...,T,
the inequality ϕh(z) ≤ yh is only effective for those components of z which are cht ,
because
−
T
∑
t=0
t 6=t∗
(β h)tuh(cmax)− (β h)t∗uh(cht∗)≤−
T
∑
t=0
(β h)tuh(cht ) = ϕh(z)≤ y
which yields with the monotonicity of uh
cht∗ ≥ (uh)−1
 1
(β h)t∗
− T∑
t=0
t 6=t∗
(β h)tuh(cmax)− y
 := ϑ ht∗ > 0.
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We define ϑ ∈ RH(T+1) as ϑ := (ϑ 10 , ...,ϑ 1T , ...,ϑH0 , ...,ϑHT ) Then we can rewrite
the section Sy as
Sy = {ϕ(z) : z ∈U ,zi ≥ ϑi i = 1, ...,H(T +1)}
which is bounded and closed, hence compact.
4 Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for Pareto
optimal points. Also here we will follow Jahn (1996, pp. 152-167) for a rigorous
derivation. First, we verify the constraint qualification for a minimal solution z of the
problem.
Lemma 2 ϕ, f and g are continuously partially differentiable at z ∈U with
– ∇ϕh(z) the vector in R2(T+1)H with −(β h)t(uh)′(cht ) at position (T +1)(h−1) to
((T +1)h) and else 0
– ∇gt(z) = (0, ...,0,−1,0, ...,0,−1,0, ...,0)T , with H entries different from zero at
position ((H + j)(T +1)+ t) for j = 0, ...,T .
– ∇ f ht (z) = (0, ...,0,τ,0, ...,0,−ξt ,1, ...,0)T ∈R2H(T+1) where the entries different
from zero correspond to cht , a
h
t and a
h
t+1 and
ξt := (τ(1+ rt)−δ ).
We denote in the usual way the active set of inequality constraints in z ∈U as
I(z) := { j ∈ {1, ...,T +1} : g j(z) = 0}.
We will need the following statements if we want to apply a theorem of Jahn (1996)
to derive the optimality conditions:
Lemma 3 The gradients
∇g j,∇ f1, ...,∇ fH(T+1)
with j ∈ I(z) are linearly independent.
Proof The only solution of
H(T+1)
∑
i=1
λi∇ fi(z)+ ∑
j∈I(z)
ς j∇g j(z) = 0
is λi = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ...,H(T + 1)} and ς j = 0 ∀ j ∈ I(z). Note that there are no entries
different from zero in the first H(t + 1) lines of ∇g j(z) which yields that λi = 0 for
all i = 1, ...,H(T +1). This in turn leads to ς j = 0 for all j ∈ I(z).
Moreover this yields the following lemma:
Lemma 4 For every minimal solution z in U there exists some z ∈ R2H(T+1) such
that
∇g j(z)T (z− z)< 0 for all j ∈ I(z).
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Proof Since∇gt(z)= (0, ...,0,−1,0, ...,0,−1,0, ...,0)T with H entries different from
zero at position ((H + j)(T +1)+ t) for j = 0, ...,T , every z ∈ R2H(T+1) with
(zt − zt)> 0 for all t = 1, ...,T +1 satisfies the desired inequality.
Hence the constraint qualification for this problem is fulfilled and we can derive
the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions.
For θ ∈RH+, ν ∈RH(T+1)+ and ρ ∈RH(T+1) we define the real-valued Lagrangian
of (6) as
L (z,θ ,ν ,ρ) :=
H
∑
i=1
θiϕi(z)+
T+1
∑
j=1
ν jg j(z)+
(T+1)H
∑
k=1
ρk fk(z). (10)
We define
ρ := (λ 10 , ...,λ
1
T , ...,λ
H
0 , ...,λ
H
T ) ∈ R(T+1)H .
Then (10) can be rewritten as
L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ) =−
H
∑
h=1
T
∑
t=0
θh(β h)tuh(cht )−
H
∑
h=1
T+1
∑
t=1
νtaht
+
H
∑
h=1
T
∑
t=0
λ ht (a
h
t+1− τωt lh− (τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht + τcht ).
(11)
Hence the first order conditions are given in the following form
Theorem 2 A vector z is Pareto-optimal if and only if there exist multipliers θ =
(θ1, ...,θH)∈RH (where at least one θh 6= 0), λ =(λ 10 , ...,λ 1T , ...,λH0 , ...,λHT )∈RH(T+1)
and ν = (ν1, ...,νT+1) ∈ RT+1 such that
(I)
∂L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ)
∂cht
=−θh(β h)t(uh)′(cht )+ τλ ht = 0, t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H
(II)
∂L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ)
∂aht
=−νt +λ ht−1−λ ht (τ(1+ rt)−δ ) = 0, t = 1, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H
(III)
∂L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ)
∂ahT+1
= λ hT −νT+1 = 0, h = 1, ...,H
and the complementary slackness condition holds
(IV) −
H
∑
h=1
νtaht = 0, t = 1, ...,T +1
(V) θh,νt ≥ 0, t = 1, ...,T +1, h = 1, ...,H.
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The proof follows directly from Jahn (1996, pp. 165-167). Note that our problem is
a convex optimization problem, since the objective function is convex and the con-
straints are linear.
We can analyze these optimality conditions a bit further and obtain the following
results.
Corollary 1 The following statements are true:
a) The multipliers λ ht are independent of the households, i.e. λ ht = λt for all t =
0, ...,T .
b) The multipliers θh > 0 are positive for all households h = 1, ...,H.
c) We have at the final time ∑Hh=1 ahT+1 = 0.
Proof a) Equation (III) yields that λ hT = νT+1 for all h = 1, ...,H, hence independent
of h. Since νt , t = 1, ...T is also independent of h, using equation (II) recursively, we
obtain that all multipliers λ ht are independent of h for t = 0, ...,T .
b) Assume there is a household h∗ such that θh∗ = 0. Then equation (I) then yields
λ h∗t = 0 for all points of time t = 0, ...,T . Since the λt = 0 are independent of h by a),
this implies by equation (I) again that θh = 0 for all h = 1, ...,H.
c) If we assume νT+1 = 0, (III) implies that λ hT = 0 for all h. With equation (I) we
then obtain for all h
θh(β h)T (uh)′(chT ) = 0.
Due to (uh)′ > 0 by assumption, this yields θh = 0 in contradiction to θh > 0 for all
h. Hence νT+1 6= 0 and by the complementary slackness condition
H
∑
h=1
ahT+1 = 0.
From an application’s point of view, the Corollary 1 can be interpreted as follows.
To understand part a) better, note that in problem (2) during the optimization
phase the capital stock aht of each individual household is not relevant but rather the
sum of all households
αt =
H
∑
h=1
aht , t = 0, ...,T,
since for each time instant t the H equality constraints can be replaced by a single
constraint
αt+1 = τωt
H
∑
h=1
lh +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )αt − τ
H
∑
h=1
cht t = 0, ...,T.
Therefore, there is per time instance only one Lagrange multiplier λt which is inde-
pendent of h.
Part b) shows that every household is influencing the minimal solution, or in other
words, if one household is omitted, the minimal solution could change immediately.
The condition in c) tells us that at the final time, everything will be consumed, which
is obvious from the application, but could also be concluded from the optimality
conditions.
In the following statement we have collected all the previous information about
the minimal solution:
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Theorem 3 Consider the original optimization problem (2) and let cht ,aht be minimal
solutions. For given initial values a10, ....,a
H
0 with ∑
H
h=1 a
h
0 > 0 there exist multipliers
θ = (θ1, ...,θH), all positive, and ν = (ν1, ...,νT+1), all nonnegative, such that the
optimal consumption cht can be obtained by solving recursively backwards
λt−1 = λt(τ(1+ rt)−δ )+νt , t = T,T −1, ...,1. (12)
with the final condition
λT = νT+1. (13)
The optimal consumption is given by
cht = ((u
h)′)−1
(
τ λt
(β h)t θh
)
h = 1, ...,H, t = 0, ...,T (14)
and the optimal capital stock aht can be computed from c
h
t by forward recursion
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht , t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H. (15)
Furthermore, the complementary slackness condition has to hold
H
∑
h=1
νtaht = 0, t = 1, ...,T and
H
∑
h=1
ahT+1 = 0. (16)
The statements follow from Theorem 2 by solving (I) for cht and in this way replacing
the λt in the forward equation for aht .
The concept for solving equations (12) - (16) can be used to set up a nonlinear
system of equations. The unknown vector is the vector of multipliers ν . The system
of nonlinear equations consists of the complementary slackness conditions, where the
vectors a depend on ν . This is formulated in corollary 2:
Corollary 2 Fix some positive multipliers θ ∈ RH . The necessary and sufficient op-
timality conditions amount to find a nonnegative solution ν ∈ RT+1 of a nonlinear
system of equations F(ν) = 0, where F : RT+1→ RT+1 is defined as follows.
Given a vector ν ∈ RT+1.
1. For T +1 given unknowns ν1, ....,νT+1, compute λ ∈ RT+1 backwards from
λT = νT+1, λt−1 = λt(τ(1+ rt)−δ )+νt , t = T,T −1, ...,1,
2. Compute forward over time t = 0, ...,T
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τ((uh)′)−1
(
τ λt
(β h)t θh
)
, h = 1, ...,H.
3. Then the evaluation of F(ν) is given by
Ft(ν) =
H
∑
h=1
νtaht , t = 1, ...,T and FT+1 =
H
∑
h=1
ahT+1.
By changing the weights θh we obtain the efficient frontier of the minimal solutions.
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5 Generalized Ramsey Model without Default
Up to this point we made the assumption that at the final time the households have a
nonnegative aggregate capital stock
H
∑
h=1
ahT+1 ≥ 0,
which implies that individual households could have negative capital stock at the end
of the time period. If one wants to avoid this situation and requires that eventually
each individual household has no negative capital stock, we have to change the single
final inequality constraint to a set of inequality constraints at time T
ahT+1 ≥ 0 h = 1, ..,H.
If one takes a closer look at the equation for the last time period
ahT+1 = τωT l
h +(τ(1+ rT )−δ )ahT − τchT
one sees quickly, that ahT+1 cannot be positive in the optimum, since in such a case
one could reduce ahT+1 to zero and at the same time increase c
h
T by the same amount
which would yield a higher value in the objective function. This contradicts the Pareto
optimality. Hence we will use here
ahT+1 = 0 h = 1, ..,H.
The resulting optimization problem changes slightly from (2) to
max
(ch,ah)
T
∑
t=0
(β h)tuh(cht ), h = 1, ...,H,
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht , cht > 0,
t = 0, ...,T −1, h = 1, ...,H
0 = τωT lh +(τ(1+ rT )−δ )ahT − τchT , chT > 0 t = 0, ...,T,
H
∑
h=1
aht ≥ 0, t = 1, ...,T
with
H
∑
h=1
ah0 > 0, (a
h
0)
H
h=1 given.
(17)
The arguments on existence of solutions and necessary and sufficient optimality con-
ditions can be modified slightly and we can prove existence of minimal points in the
same way as for the previous problem. However, the optimality conditions change
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due to the new set of inequality constraints. To interpret these properly we define the
modified Lagrangian for this case.
L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ) =−
H
∑
h=1
T
∑
t=0
θh(β h)tuh(cht )−
H
∑
h=1
T
∑
t=1
νtaht
+
H
∑
h=1
T−1
∑
t=0
λ ht (a
h
t+1− τωt lh− (τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht + τcht )
+
H
∑
h=1
λ hT (−τωT lh− (τ(1+ rT )−δ )ahT + τchT )
(18)
The theorem on optimality conditions is rewritten as follows
Theorem 4 A vector z is Pareto-optimal if and only if there exist multipliers θ =
(θ1, ...,θH)∈RH (where at least one θh 6= 0), λ =(λ 10 , ...,λ 1T , ...,λH0 , ...,λHT )∈RH(T+1),
ν = (ν1, ...,νT+1) ∈ RT+1 such that
(I)
∂L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ)
∂cht
=−θh(β h)t(uh)′(cht )+ τλ ht = 0, t = 0, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H
(II)
∂L (z;θ ,ν ,ρ)
∂aht
=−νt +λ ht−1−λ ht (τ(1+ rt)−δ ) = 0, t = 1, ...,T, h = 1, ...,H
and the complementary slackness condition holds
(IV) νt
H
∑
h=1
aht = 0 t = 1, ...,T,
(V) θh,νt ≥ 0, h = 1, ...,H, t = 1, ...,T.
In a similar way as for the previous problem, we can collect the information in a
different form which also leads to a system of nonlinear equations.
Theorem 5 Consider the modified optimization problem (17) and let cht ,aht be min-
imal solutions. For given initial values a10, ....,a
H
0 with ∑
H
h=1 a
h
0 > 0 there exist mul-
tipliers θ = (θ1, ...,θH), all nonnegative with at least one being positive, and ν =
(ν1, ...,νT ), all nonnegative, such that the optimal capital stock aht can be computed
from the optimal consumption cht by forward recursion
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht , t = 0, ...,T −1. (19)
The optimal consumption cht can be obtained by solving recursively backwards for
each h = 1, ...,H
cht−1 = ((u
h)′)−1
(
β h(τ(1+ rt)−δ )(uh)′(cht )+
τ νt
(β h)t−1θh
)
t = T,T −1, ...,1.
(20)
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with an unknown final condition. Furthermore, the complementary slackness condi-
tion has to hold
νt
H
∑
h=1
aht = 0, t = 1, ...,T (21)
and the capital at the final time vanishes
τωT lh +(τ(1+ rT )−δ )ahT − τchT = 0, h = 1, ...H. (22)
The statements follow from Theorem 4 by solving (I) for cht and replacing this way
the λ in (II).
We can use the optimality conditions again to set up a system of nonlinear equa-
tions. Here, the unknown vector is (ν ,cT ) and the nonlinear equations consist of the
complementary slackness conditions and the vanishing final capital stock.
Corollary 3 Fix some positive multipliers θ ∈RH . The optimality conditions amount
to finding a nonnegative solution ν ∈ RT and a vector cT ∈ RH of a system of non-
linear equations F(ν ,cT ) = 0, where F : RT+H → RT+H is defined as follows.
Given vectors (ν ,cT ) ∈ RT+H .
1. For T +H given unknowns ν1, ....,νT ,c1T , ...,cHT , compute cht backwards from
cht−1 = ((u
h)′)−1
(
β h(τ(1+ rt)−δ )(uh)′(cht )+
τ νt
(β h)t−1θh
)
for t = T,T −1, ...,1 and h = 1, ...,H.
2. Compute forward over time t = 0, ...,T −1
aht+1 = τωt l
h +(τ(1+ rt)−δ )aht − τcht , h = 1, ...,H.
3. Then the evaluation of F(ν ,cT ) is given by
Ft(ν ,cT ) = νt
H
∑
h=1
aht , t = 1, ...,T
and
FT+h(ν ,cT ) = τωT lh +(τ(1+ rT )−δ )ahT − τchT , h = 1, ...,H
6 Numerical Results
In order to analyze the economic implications of default or non-default in the gen-
eralized Ramsey model with new budget constraint, we implemented both problem
formulations and compared the Pareto optimal solutions of the two models.
Within this paper, all households have identical preferences according to instan-
taneous utility. They differ in their initial capital endowments and time preferences.
We expect that the most patient household, which is the one with the highest β , will
consume the most in both models. This is only logical since the time preference is a
multiplicative constant in the objective function.
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We consider a coalition of four different households, 100 time steps and constant
interest and wage rates. We assume logarithmic utility preferences for all households,
constant labor supply and a depreciation rate greater than zero. In order to solve
the optimality conditions, we have to fix the ‘scalarization’-parameters θ h as well.
Every Pareto solution will depend on one special choice of these θ h. Varying these
parameters yields the whole Pareto front, but in this framework we will fix them such
that all households are weighted equally.
The parameter constellation is then given by
H = 4, θ h = 1/H, T = 100, r = 0.03, ω = 1, l = 1, τ = 1, δ = 0.01
and uh(c) = log(c) for all h = 1, ...,H. The households differ according to their time
preferences, β h, which we set to
β 1 = 0.9, β 2 = 0.93, β 3 = 0.95, β 4 = 0.98
and their initial capital endowments which we fix at
a10 = 30, a
2
0 = 20, a
3
0 = 10, a
4
0 = 10.
We obtain the following results for the problem with default:
Fig. 1: Capital Stocks in the Model with Default Fig. 2: Consumption Paths in the Model with Default
The plot shows that the most patient household (i.e. number 4) leaves the econ-
omy at the end with high debt. He seems to run a Ponzi scheme. Household 3 only
slightly engages in debt. The other two households hold positive capital stocks to
fund that debt of 3 and 4. We also oberserve (see Figure 5) that the coalition reduces
its initial net-capital stock at a high rate. After 38 periods, it does not hold positive
net-capital stocks anymore. From a macroeconomic perspective, this strategy cannot
serve as a role model for the economy.
Consumption of households 2−4 turns out as expected, but household 1 exhibts
a strange pattern: As long as the the coalitions net-capital stock is strictly positive, he
slightly reduces consumption. Afterwards (i.e. t ≥ 38) he starts to consume more at a
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decreasing rate. The households with smaller β prefer consumption at the very begin-
ning. The more patient a household is, the more consumption is shifted towards the
end (remark that the households are ordered according to the size of their β starting
with household one).
In the nondefault model, where every household has to leave the economy at the
end with at least a nonnegative capital stock, the behaviour of the households is quite
different to the previous case.
Fig. 3: Capital Stocks in the Model without Default Fig. 4: Consumption Paths in the Model without Default
Indeed, there are still some households that finance consumption of others, i.e.
they incur debt and do not raise their consumption level, but the households have
changed their roles. In the model without default household four, which is the most
patient one, and household one hold positive capital stocks in every period. House-
hold two and three now incur debt.
Different than we expected, the household with the highest β has a nearly constant
level of consumption. We would expect that its consumption would raise towards the
end since its gain of utility is discounted weaker compared to the others. The saving
and consumption behavior of household one surprises as well. This household has the
smallest time discount factor β . Hence we would expect it to prefer consumption at
the beginning and then reduce consumption towards the end. The initial consumption
is indeed very high and the consumption level then decreases quite fast but it rises
again after period 50. Another interesting observation is the small difference between
household two and three. The development of their capital stocks seems to be quite
similar as does their consumption behavior.
Comparing the solutions of both problems, we conclude that permitting agents to
default on their debt as long as the coalition is on its budget contraint at any point in
time makes a huge difference. In the model with default the most patient household
seems to dominate the less patient ones. It incurs high debt and consumes the most.
Moreover, it nearly forces the other households in poverty. This exclusive right to
consumption owned by the fourth household vanishes in the model without default.
Here, not only time preferences but also initial capital endowments seem to have an
impact on the optimal capital and consumption allocation.
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If we consider the aggregated capital stocks and consumption paths, both prob-
lems are quite similar. Aggregated consumption stays nearly constant over time. The
aggregated capital stock declines in both cases.
Fig. 5: Aggregated Capital Stock with and without default Fig. 6: Aggregated Consumption with and without default
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a Ramsey model with an agreed default within a coalition
of heterogeneous households. This problem leads to a vector-valued objective func-
tion which is treated in the context of vector optimization. We work out a rigorous
mathematical framework in order to prove the existence of the utility maximizing
allocations of capital and consumption via time for all agents. Necessary and suffi-
cient optimality conditions are derived for this constrained nonlinear multi-objective
optimization problem. We adapt this model to the case of no default. As shown in
the numerical example, this adaptation can have a huge impact on the behavior of
the single households, whereas the Pareto optimal solution of both problems does not
change much if the coalition is considered from outside.
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